Ukraine’s Kursk Incursion: What We Know So Far

Listen to Event Audio

Earlier this week, Ukraine shocked the world by launching a surprise military operation into the Russian Federation. Open-source intelligence shows that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have made considerable advances in the first 72 hours of the incursion, but many details remain unknown.

Join Hudson experts Luke Coffey and Can Kasapoğlu for a discussion, moderated by Dan Kochis, on what this move means for the war and how this risk could pay off for Ukraine.

Event Transcript

This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.

Dan Kochis:

Good evening. Thank you for joining us at Hudson Institute. I’m Daniel Kochis, Senior Fellow in the Center on Europe and Eurasia, and today we’re joined by two Senior Fellows also in the Center on Europe and Eurasia, but more importantly, two of the foremost experts on the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine. That is Luke Coffey and Dr. Can Kasapoğlu, who just in fact publishes a weekly Ukraine military situation report, which has been a timely resource for me and hopefully for some of you out there. This comes out every Wednesday and I would encourage you all to subscribe to it.

But today we have a couple fellows with sterling CVs. But in the interest of getting into the discussion, I want to dive right in. On Tuesday, Ukrainian forces began an offensive and crossed into the Kursk Oblast of the Russian Federation. Since that time, they’ve made rapid advancements. Some estimates have them controlling 430 square kilometers of Kursk. That’s an area over seven times the size of Manhattan Island. So, Luke, if maybe if I could start with you, can you set the stage for us maybe taking a step back. What can you tell us about this offensive broadly? Why did Ukraine launch it into Kursk specifically, and why now?

Luke Coffey:

Thanks, Dan. Well, that’s a very good question to start us off. I’m sure observers of the war in Ukraine have noticed in the past that Ukrainian forces, or I should say forces aligned with Ukraine, have conducted raids and skirmishes across the state border from Ukraine inside the Russian Federation. In the past, these have normally been soldiers from the Free Russian Legion, so Russians who are anti-Putin and supporting Ukraine. And we’ve seen soldiers from the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, which are Chechens who are against Putin and have aligned with Ukraine. We’ve seen Georgian Legion activity also in some of these raids and skirmishes.

But what makes this one different is that so far it doesn’t appear to be a raid. It looks like that the Ukrainians have crossed the state border into the Russian Federation with some intent at least, of holding some of the territory that they’ve captured so far. And what else is different about this recent operation compared to the ones we’ve seen in the past, is that we now see through open source intelligence reporting that regular Ukrainian units are involved in this operation.

Now, why Kursk Oblast? I think there are a number of reasons. In the past we saw these cross-border raids happen into Belgorod Oblast. Kursk Oblast is just north of Belgorod Oblast. If you picture a map of Ukraine, think of almost the northeastern corner. The nearest large Ukrainian city is Sumy. It’s this area of the world, if you can picture it in your mind. And Kursk Oblast in the 18th century became a region where there was a lot of Ukrainians moving to. And as a result, over the centuries and the decades, there is an established Ukrainian identity there, culture, language. Now of course, as the years have gone by, and especially with a lot of the Soviet Union’s movement, mass movement, mass deportations, and movement of peoples, the ethnic Ukrainian population has declined in recent years in what is now Kursk Oblast in the Russian Federation. But there’s no doubt in my mind that your average Ukrainian watching this play out on the news, they see some sort of sentimental or even emotional or even cultural attachment to what the Ukrainian soldiers are doing in Kursk Oblast.

And this is, I think, important from a messaging point of view because it shows the hypocrisy of Russia. Ukraine could go in and say, “Well, these are ethnic Ukrainians and we’re annexing this territory to Ukraine. We’re going to have a referendum.” And that’s what Russia has been doing in Ukraine. Of course, the Ukrainians have shown no intention of doing this, but I think by entering a region that has historically had ethnic Ukrainians living there, I think they highlight Russia’s hypocrisy there on this issue.

Another reason why I think it was Kursk Oblast is because of the key transport links. There are a couple of major roads that Russia depends on for their war effort in Ukraine. There’s also a rail network. And also that you have the Sudzha gas terminal, which is where the main gas terminal, where the main gas prom pipelines meet before the pipelines enter Ukraine and then onto Europe. Now, most of Russia’s piped natural gas to Europe has been halted, but believe it or not, however extraordinary this might sound, there is still Russian gas that is being transported that transits Ukrainian territory that goes to some places in Europe. Now, President Zelenskyy has said that at the end of this year when this contract runs out, he’s not renewing it. We don’t know what the status of the pipeline is right now, but we do know from open source intelligence reporting that Ukrainian soldiers seem to be in control of this gas terminal.

And then also I think terrain played an important role. We’re all familiar with the Battle of Kursk from World War II, one of the largest, if not the largest, tank battles in history. And the terrain is suitable, at least most of Kursk Oblast, the terrain is suitable for this type of armored maneuver warfare that we’re seeing Ukraine conduct right now. And of course, Can will get into this more when he gives his more detailed tactical military analysis of the situation.

But Dan, I want to say a few more points on the timing of this. It’s August. The world’s watching the Olympics. Europe is on vacation. And every August and any election year in the United States is a very busy month politically for the country. So I think there’s maybe some calculation on who would be paying attention and who wouldn’t be paying attention to this move into Kursk Oblast. Also, we’re now about four and a half months or so from the big supplemental that was passed in Congress back in March. Of course, after Congress passed that big supplemental package, we knew it was going to take weeks, if not months, for this aid to get to the front lines of Ukraine. This is probably that moment where they’ve been able to build up and resupply and refit because of the supplemental that was passed by Congress back in March. So I think that has also played a role. And it was also the anniversary week of the 2008 Russian Invasion of Georgia. So I think there’s probably some symbolism that was attached there. And we know from, again, open source reporting that there are Georgian units that are operating as part of this operation inside the Russian Federation.

And then finally, if traditional weather patterns in Ukraine occur this fall, then the Ukrainians are probably timing it right to where by launching an operation in August, they can conduct their maneuvered warfare, use armored vehicles and tanks before the muddy season in the fall starts, and then at that point consolidate their gains, build defensive lines, and then at least for a few weeks, the mud will make it difficult for Russia to react in any meaningful way. I would like to note that in 2022 when Ukraine launched its counteroffensive in Kherson, it was launched in August, and also the counteroffensive in Kharkiv that year was launched in early September, so around the same timeframe. So I think there was something to do with that as well when it comes to the timing of this decision. But I’m sure Can will be able to add so much more when it comes to the tactical military situation on the ground as it pertains to what we know from open source intelligence reporting.

Dan Kochis:

Well, thank you for that scene setter, Luke. I think certainly the symbolism of the timing I’m sure will not be lost of Vladimir Putin. And so, Can, a couple of questions that I have are, one, do you see this as having been a smaller scale operation from the Ukrainians, which is bill it out because of the success or was it always planned to be at the scale that we’re seeing now. And then, on a technical level, where are we? Obviously, there’s not a lot of reporting for the Ukrainian side, so you have to look a lot at Russian sources. So what are you seeing in the current moment in terms of the tactical situation in Kursk?

Can Kasapoğlu:

Thanks, Dan. These are two great questions to get a true understanding of the unfolding situation. First of all, it is very dynamic. Open source intelligence has its limits, but right now we are testing how these limits could go far. And one shout-out, one call-out to the friends of Ukraine, please do not share real-time, open source intelligence evidence. Because real-time, open source intelligence evidence expose Ukrainian tactical combat formations, especially a store name or a building in a specific address, if it is real-time, do not share that. We are monitoring that very closely, but we are not publishing, or releasing, or sharing that information publicly.

Well, first of all, this is, as Luke pointed out, very different from the previous rates as we observed in Belgorod. The aim here looking at the fourth generation, as we call it, is not doing the damage, inflicting the casualties, and just leaving the Russian territory. The fourth generation suggests that we have at least four Ukrainian brigades allocated for this operation. Two being mechanized brigades, two air assault brigades, and air assault brigades are penetrating very deep into the Russian territory, when the mechanized brigades are establishing the second echelons, if you like, as the defensive formations. We have seen up to 20 miles of penetration. But this is the conventional incursion force, if you like, that penetrated into the Russian territory.

We are monitoring right now, ambushes, especially there is a highway, E38 Highway going west to east. Again, our audience should, I would strongly suggest getting a glimpse into a map when following this conversation. We are seeing ambushes in this highway, which suggests up to 40 miles and even deeper penetration by the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces. But that being said, this operation is not commanded and overseen by the Ukrainian Special Operations. This is a conventional operation. It combines a combined arms maneuver warfare effort, commanded and overseen by the Ukrainian General Staff.

So, what we saw initially was a blitz, very interestingly, of the Ukrainian drones on the Russian drones, surveillance drones, because they direct the artillery fire and they give an overall snapshot of the tactical situation to the Russian Tactical and Operational Commanders in the area.

Second, very interesting that we saw a surge in the Ukrainian electronic warfare capabilities. So they blinded the Russian sensor capabilities in the area. And capitalizing on that advantage, the incursion, the large bulk incursion, happened with thousands of Ukrainian troops pouring into Kursk, the Russian territory. And, this opening stage is more or less akin to the opening stages by the Egyptian Arab Army of the 1973 War, when the Egyptian Arab Army combat formations, because they couldn’t have air superiority over the Israel defense forces, they were moving in a limited fashion under the air defense umbrella. We are seeing that the Ukrainian combat formations, except for the Special Operations forces that went deep into the Russian convoys pathways and reinforcements pathways, we are seeing that the Ukrainian combat formations, the bulk of the incursion, is well within the air defense and electronic warfare umbrella right now. And in the meantime, they’re establishing defensive positions.

One thing which is important, we saw that movie actual one year ago during the Wagner Uprising, that there is a critical LECO capability in the Russian military that they cannot react fast. It took Wagner 24 hours to capture the Southern Military District Headquarters, and then move north to the outer gates of Moscow. The Ukrainians are taking advantage of this paralysis moment of the Russian statecraft. And, right now we are seeing that they are speeding up to capitalize on the momentum that they have gained, and the operations so far are favoring Kiev over Moscow.

Of course, the situation, as I said, is very dynamic, it can change. The Russian reinforcements are trying to make their way as we are closely watching to Kursk. One thing to add, I will also give more room to your questions. But one thing to specifically monitor here is which Russian units are coming to help as reinforcements. Because if the Russians are pulling units from the northern grouping of forces, which are right now running the invasion of Kharkiv, it would mean a relief for the Kharkiv front for the defensive combat operations of the Ukrainian military. If they’re going to take troops from the East Donetsk sector, especially running the offensive combat operations in the Pokrov’s direction right now, it would mean a relief for the East. So the courses of action that the Russian High Command take in sending reinforcements, which specific type of unit, would be really important here.

Dan Kochis:

Thank you. That was a terrific deep dive into where we are today. Luke, if I could go back to you, since the war began, there’s been this consistent hesitation in some capitals, especially here in Washington, to really take the gloves off of Ukrainian forces, so to speak, for fear of setting off a cycle of escalation. So, what does the Kursk Offensive, in your view, mean now for Western capitals?

Luke Coffey:

Well, there are probably a lot of nervous senior policymakers in various capitals across Europe and here in the United States. There will be some in Western Europe who I think are maybe uncomfortable with this, because they’ve never wanted Ukraine to really win, they’ve only wanted Ukraine to survive, and they’ve armed Ukraine as such. They’ve armed them to survive, not armed them to win. But then you have some in Eastern Europe who are no doubt popping popcorn right now as they watch this play out on social media. And then here in Washington, I think if you speak to some in the White House, they’re not going to be enthusiastic about this, and I thought that this would create some problems for Ukraine.

However, it was announced today that another $125 million aid package, including artillery rounds, stingers, javelins, and other assorted munitions is being authorized and sent to Ukraine. Now knowing the Biden Administration’s bad habit, especially in the case of Israel of withholding weapons and munitions to try to use that as leverage, I am pleasantly surprised that the White House has decided to go ahead with this aid package. Which to me at least, means that there’s some sort of tacit or implicit approval with what is going on. Or, maybe the White House realizes now at this point that it’s a fait accompli and there’s nothing they can do about it anyway. The Ukrainians are conducting this operation, so they have no choice but to get in line and to support Ukraine at this time. So that’s positive.

And of course, you have favorable statements coming from London, and like I said, other Eastern European capitals. So it’s important that, I go back to my earlier point, we give Ukraine the weapons that needs to win and not just to survive. And for Ukraine doing an operation, an audacious operation like this, is a way to change the narrative in Western capitals where for months it’s been, we’re still talking about the counteroffensive of 2023 that didn’t deliver the results that everybody wanted. We’re still talking about the perceived stalemate or even the tactical Russian advancements that have been made in places like Donetsk. And we don’t really focus on some of the recent achievements, especially in the Black Sea against the Black Sea Fleet with Ukraine’s drone program tracking targets deep inside Russia. But seeing what we’re seeing now unfold inside the Russian Federation, seeing the Ukrainian flag hoisted over the Sudzha gas terminal or other municipal buildings kind of giving Russia a taste of their own medicine. This is changing the narrative. We’re seeing this now in the headlines and social media. So I think this is a positive thing. I want to say one point following up on what Can was saying about social media and OPSEC, operational security, the fact that the Ukrainians were able to mobilize a significantly sized force along the border of the Russian Federation and conduct this operation in a way that was, at least from an outside observer, it was a surprise to Russia.

It was a surprise by many, I mean if you look at the evidence on the ground, it must have been a surprise to Russia the fact that they were able to do this in this day and age of social media, of open source intelligence reporting, of commercially available satellite imagery, tells me that the force that Ukraine is using is very motivated and very disciplined. Because you don’t have this level of operational security unless you have motivated and disciplined soldiers. So this isn’t a ragtag army that was thrown together to conduct this operation. There was clearly a lot of thought and planning put into this, and it’s going to be interesting to see how this plays out over the coming days and weeks.

Dan Kochis:

Thank you, Luke. Can, if I can go back to you two questions that I have. One, there’s been some criticism at least early on Tuesday and early and Wednesday about Ukraine diverting forces, which could have been used in other sectors, which are under pressure. Offensive units tend to take more casualties than defensive ones. So do you think that this could end up being a pure victory for Ukraine or how do you see that? And then the other question I have is is regarding some sources talking about another Ukrainian buildup around Belgrade and potential second offensive in that direction. And how do you see that?

Can Kasapoğlu:

Well, first of all, that’s a trade-off and that’s a risk that Ukraine has to take at the political military level, I believe. Why I’m pronounced using the political military and just underlining the political part, we have to be realistic here. Even the essay that General Zaluzhnyi, the former chief of the Ukrainian military wrote was on positional warfare. Right now, what we are seeing from a technical military standpoint is that the battlefield geometry is very static and very bizarrely it is married to a very attritional warfare. So we are seeing a lot of combat activity, a lot of personnel killed in action at both sides. A lot of casualties and mounting casualties. We are talking about thousands every day and tens of thousands sometimes, every week combined. But what we are seeing is very incremental changes in the battlefield geometry. Given these circumstances, even though I have and proud the Hudson Institute has a very pro-Ukrainian stance, it might be unrealistic to assume that if the military aid goes as it is, as Luke suggested, if we do not start arming Ukraine to win this war.

But if we arm Ukraine to avoid a catastrophic collapse when the music stops, it won’t be possible for the Ukrainian military to recapture all the invaded territory. So what I suggest from a political military perspective with a pronounced emphasis on the political side is that when this music stops, Ukraine should also be seizing Russian territory as a diplomatic leverage when it comes to the negotiations. It shouldn’t be Ukraine, you have to make Kyiv, Zelenskyy government, you have to make territorial concessions to have peace. It should be both Moscow and Kyiv talking about territory and territorial exchange. And when the music stops, Ukraine should hold Russian territory not to invade it permanently, but as political leverage. So I think if there was one shot, especially ahead of the American elections, and given the prospects that there could be any administration, a Republican administration and that Republican administration under President Trump could force a diplomatic solution to this problem, I think Ukraine needs that leverage in its back pocket, like holding some Russian territory.

It doesn’t matter the proportion, it doesn’t matter how big it is, some Russian territory. So that is a risk to be taken, and as long as you can catch the Russians off guard, that risk is worth it, I think. And it is paying off, although we are in the baby steps of that incursion, I think it is paying off. The second part of that question is the military risk. And if you open me blunt, ask me if the situation in the east and the north is pressing, especially in the east, the CoCroS direction, are the Ukrainian lines of defenses facing a risk of collapsing? Unfortunately, I would say yes. We are seeing a surge in the Russian first generation there. The Russians are bringing new manpower to the battleground, and the Kremlin seems to be politically immune to mounting casualties of the Russian combat formations.

Like thousands of Russian servicemen dead on the Ukrainian battleground means almost nothing to President Putin and the KGB hailing clan around him. So under these conditions, the Russian military has force on force ratio and force to terrain ratio, as we call it, advantages over the Ukrainian armed forces. And yes, the situation in the east and the situation in the north-east are really pressing. But again, politically I think that was a risk that the armed forces had to take very carefully capitalizing on the surprise factor and it is going well. Second, unrelated to that, here is an article that the western academia will never publish, and I will never read. The Russians provoked Ukraine by bringing the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to the Ukrainian borders. And this is why they cornered the Zelenskyy government to launch the invasion into the Russian territory. And if we want to avoid a global scale war between great powers, Moscow has to make territorial concessions.

So I think Kyiv knows this double standard. This is not something that I’m going to read from the western academia or the western diplomacy nowadays. And I think knowing those double standards and knowing that they’re not only battling the Ukrainian military, but also restrictions on military assistance. Dragging feet about getting one type of main battle tank for one year in Berlin, the defense diplomacy report for Leopard 2 tanks, for attack MS for the F-16s. And then even when they get it, the restrictions on the operational use, this is an uphill battle to fight. And I think offensive operations going unorthodox like this was the only way that they can pull it off. But is there a risk? Yes, definitely there is a risk. These lines of defenses of the Ukrainian armed forces are facing a real threat in the east and the northeast definitely.

Dan Kochis:

A couple of final questions, maybe Can, if I could stay with you. Russia, as you mentioned early on, is rushing reinforcements to the region, potentially some mercenary reinforcements as well. So do you see Ukraine as having sort of a natural objective to stop and dig in to fortify? How do you see this playing out potentially over the next few days and a week?

Can Kasapoğlu:

There are certain trends that we have to be very careful about when analyzing this situation. First of all, as to combat formations, we are talking about two categorically different Ukrainian brigades operating in the area, mechanized formations and air assault brigades. Air assault brigades are literally raging pitfalls. They penetrate deep and very fast into the adversaries like second and third echelons. And whenever they face a defensive position, which is robust and tough, they do not spend time on that. They just work their way around because their objective is to go deeper and deeper, deeper. It is mechanized formations. They are more stronger, rough, tough, but slower. They go and fill the gap as the second echelon and the third echelon of the offensive. One thing that we should be very careful about, and the Ukrainian military should be very careful about that these pioneers, the air assault brigades shouldn’t outrun their artillery and their air defense umbrella because they would be very exposed to the Russian counteroffensives if they outrun and penetrate deeper than planned into the Russian lines of defenses first.

Second, the Ukrainian electronic warfare capabilities made a true difference, but they have to keep it going. Because that kind of operation needs the utmost careful planning in command control and communications. All Ukrainian units should be cooperating very closely to pull it off in hostile territory. And the Russian electronic warfare so far couldn’t suppress it, and it has to continue like that. I think this is the second point. The third point is we are looking at the Russian race reinforcements that they’re bringing to the area. Especially we are trying to understand which sector that these guys are coming from, but also we have to keep an eye as to what the Ukrainians are bringing. Today I saw 155 millimeter class NATO-standard heavy artillery making it to the front line. This is going to be important, the Ukrainian artillery, the Ukrainian air defense systems, and if there is one place that the F-16s can make an early debut and early difference is, I think it is the Kursk region.

What I mean is not establishing a superiority over the Russian aerospace forces, which is not possible. But in order to give Ukraine a chance to capitalize on the momentum and to make the most of this initial window to establish its defenses and penetrate as deep as possible, I think this is the time. One last thing before just wrapping it up and give the stage to Luke. If there is one moment that the Ukrainian military needs to conduct deep strikes into the Russian assembly areas because the Russians different, they’re going to counterattack. And before counterattack. . . I don’t want to go into defense deep, but before counterattack, they will assemble their forces. They will amass their troops. These areas will be very exposed to weapon systems like ATACMS, himars, especially with cluster munitions warheads. If there is one moment that the Ukrainians need no caveats or restrictions or the use of the Western donated weapon systems, it is now.

Dan Kochis:

Thank you for that analysis. And Luke, maybe if you could bring it home, today, President Zelenskyy talked about. . . Said that Russia brought the war to our land and should feel what it has done. So can you comment on maybe the trade-off about bringing this war and making it real to the Russians to support Putin regime and criticisms that maybe Ukraine is somehow undermining its moral position by occupying Russian territory.

Luke Coffey:

Yeah. So this is why it is important that the Ukrainians are doing such a move as entering the Russian Federation and taking control of Russian territory. It sends a message not only to the Ukrainian people and also to their supporters in the West that more than two years into this war, they’re still in it to win it. They’re not ready to throw on the towel and they’re going to keep at it. That sends that important message. But it also sends a message to Russia that, look, you’re supposed to be in Kiev in three days, and now your president’s on television telling that each displaced person in Kursk Oblast will get 10,000 rubles as consolation. It’s about $115, right? So we’ve gone from three days in Kiev to 10,000 rubles in a matter of a couple of years. So it reinforces that narrative to the Russian people that maybe this so-called special military operation isn’t going as originally planned, and maybe, you, the Russian people should view this with a little more scrutiny.

Now, Can talked about trade-offs and how these political military decisions have to be made and there that there are consequences to these decisions being made. The history of warfare is littered with many examples of such moves like this, working out brilliantly, having a huge strategic impact in a very positive way. But history also shows us that there are cases of these sort of operations that end badly and end poorly. So we have to wait to see what happens. But by Ukraine doing what they’re doing, they’re changing the narrative. They’re dominating the narrative now in Western capitals and Ukraine and I dare say inside the Russian Federation, and they’ve changed any existing equilibrium or the existing ecosystem of this conflict has now been thrown out of whack. So we are now in uncharted territory on how this may end in Kursk, in Ukraine and in the region.

And I’ll just conclude here, Mamuka Mamulashvili who’s the very experienced and seasoned commander of the Georgian Legion in Ukraine fighting in Ukraine, obviously he’s Georgian. He once tweeted about a year and a half ago, I’ll never forget it, he said that Russia’s war in Ukraine will someday end inside the Russian Federation. And I think that was quite telling at that time that he knew what needed to be done. People who follow this closely, they understand what needs to be done. President Zelenskyy knows what needs to be done. We just need our leadership here in the West to enable the Ukrainians to do what they need to do.

Dan Kochis:

The last few days have certainly shaken the strategic picture in Eastern Ukraine. So Luke Coffey, Can Kasapoğlu, thank you both very much for your analysis. Thank you for everyone for listening in today. You can follow their work at Hudson.org. I encourage you to follow and subscribe to Sean’s Ukraine military situation report, which comes out weekly as well as Luke’s frequent writings on the situation going on in Ukraine. So thank you, and with that, I look forward to being with you all again soon.