The British government last week published its long-awaited Strategic Defence Review. Led by former Defence Secretary and NATO secretary general Lord Robertson, the review outlines the major geopolitical challenges facing Britain and offers 62 recommendations to make the UK and its allies more secure. The government accepted all of them.
Unsurprisingly, the review identifies Russia as the most acute threat to UK security. However, it also highlights the challenges posed by China, North Korea, and Iran. While many of the findings reaffirm existing concerns, the review makes three particularly important observations and course corrections that deserve attention.
First, it shows that the UK is taking seriously the military lessons from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. After three years of near-nightly missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities, the need for robust air defense is clearer than ever. The review pledges £1 billion in new funding for homeland air and missile defense, a long-overdue investment.
Another lesson from Ukraine is the critical importance of a strong defense industrial base capable of producing large quantities of munitions and artillery shells. At points during the war, Russia and Ukraine were expending more shells in a week than some European countries manufacture in an entire year. When the time came to supply Ukraine, many European nations lacked sufficient stockpiles. This was a wake-up call — especially for countries that had allowed their defense industries to atrophy.
The UK is now taking steps to address this. The review commits £6 billion to build six new munitions and missile factories, including £1.5 billion for an “always-on” production facility. This means Britain will be able to rapidly surge production in a crisis without starting from scratch. Additionally, the review commits to producing 7,000 long-range strike weapons in the near term, another recognition of evolving battlefield needs.
Second, the review firmly reorientates the UK toward European security by adopting a “NATO First” policy. This means prioritizing Britain’s role in the alliance above other regional or global commitments. The timing is appropriate. Since Britain left the EU in 2019, its place in Europe has often been questioned. But following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK has reasserted its leadership role in European defense — both within NATO and through bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
The document also emphasizes the UK’s continued engagement in the Middle East, especially with the Gulf states.
The explicit commitment to NATO First is a welcome signal to Britain’s European partners. It affirms that, even outside the EU, the UK remains a key pillar of the continent’s defense architecture.
Third, while NATO remains the primary focus, the UK will continue to project power globally. The review confirms plans to produce a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarines, developed jointly with the US and Australia under the AUKUS partnership. This capability extends Britain’s reach far beyond Europe and demonstrates that, in the words of the review, “NATO First does not mean NATO only.”
The document also emphasizes the UK’s continued engagement in the Middle East, especially with the Gulf states. Each of the six Gulf monarchies is mentioned by name, and the review reaffirms Britain’s long-standing naval presence in Bahrain — an essential strategic foothold in the region.
Despite these strengths, the review contains gaps and raises concerns, particularly around funding. Accepting all 62 recommendations is politically bold, but doing so without guaranteed funding is risky. Although the government has pledged to increase defense spending from 2.3 percent to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2027, this falls short of the 3–5 percent levels being discussed by NATO leaders before their summit this month in The Hague.
Take, for example, the eight new attack submarines: there is no full funding commitment. The government promises new investment “in future years,” but offers no guarantees. A so-called Defense Investment Plan will be published this year to detail how these ambitions will be financed. But for now, this ambiguity leaves observers uncertain. Why accept all recommendations if the Treasury hasn’t formally agreed to pay for them?
Another concern is the lack of whole-of-government coordination. Unlike the previous Conservative-led government, which conducted numerous Strategic Defence and Security Reviews, the Labour government dropped the “security” component. Past reviews incorporated not only military planning, but also issues such as cybersecurity, border control, counterterrorism, and resilience against pandemics and disinformation. These are vital elements of national security, and omitting them risks undermining Britain’s broader preparedness.
The new review does warn of threats from cyberattacks, assaults on critical infrastructure, and disinformation campaigns, but these threats are often outside the remit of the armed forces to address. Unless the government embraces a cross-departmental approach and integrates other security agencies into defense planning, it risks creating dangerous blind spots.
Perhaps the most glaring issue is the size of the British armed forces. If there is one lesson from Ukraine, it is that large, professional armies still matter. Britain’s Army currently stands at just 74,400 soldiers. The review proposes to increase this to 76,000 after the next election, a marginal boost that will also take years to implement. This is insufficient. Moreover, a smaller conventional force shrinks the recruitment pool for the UK’s elite special forces, who are typically drawn from the regular military.
Despite these challenges, the review is an important first step. Its focus on NATO, industrial resilience, and lessons from Ukraine are encouraging signs that Labour is serious about restoring Britain’s defense credibility. But serious work remains. Unless the government fully funds its promises, addresses the absence of cross-government security integration, and expands the armed forces in a meaningful way, the review will fall short of its ambitions.
When Labour last came to power in 1997, they published a defense review in 1998 but then failed to produce another during their entire 13 years in office. This time, they should follow the Conservative model and commit to conducting reviews every few years. As this review rightly notes, the world is becoming more dangerous. It is in everyone’s interest for Britain to remain a strong, credible force on the global stage.