The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad, is the centerpiece of U.S. Indo-Pacific diplomacy, but contrary to the desire of American strategic planners, it is far from being the lynchpin of regional security. The Quad brings together three Asian democracies – Australia, India, and Japan – and the resident external power, the United States. It is an ad hoc nonsecurity grouping that has retained attention even though the second Trump administration views multilateralism, multilateral institutions, and security alliances with suspicion.
The United States is recalibrating its global involvement based on selective hard power considerations. The Quad, however, is not yet a hard power actor. In his confirmation hearing in January 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio delineated the second Trump administration’s policymaking priorities based on three questions: “Does it make America safer? Does it make America stronger? And does it make America more prosperous?”
The Quad has, so far, not made the U.S. safer, stronger, or more prosperous. But the administration continues to see it as important, primarily because of its potential in containing China’s rising power and influence. The Quad countries encompass over 2 billion people and together account for one-third of global gross GDP; their combined efforts would go a long way toward countering China.
Quad’s Origins
The Quad was first forged, informally, in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami when Australia, India, Japan, and the United States coordinated to mobilize humanitarian assistance and disaster relief across the region. Three years later, in 2007, the idea of the Quad as a standing group was conceived, with late Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo pitching the concept of these four democracies working together to strengthen regional stability based on shared norms and interests.
After a fizzling out in 2008, the Quad grouping was resuscitated in 2017 under the first Donald Trump administration, amid growing concerns about China’s aggressive economic and military expansion in the region. The subsequent Biden administration then further elevated the Quad, adding annual leader-level summits to the existing foreign ministers’ dialogue. Both the frequency of annual meetings and the breadth of agenda items significantly expanded.
If the goal was to create an Indo-Pacific minilateral, the Quad can be counted as a success. In under a decade, the four countries have enhanced cooperation beyond humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) into health security, debt management, regional connectivity and infrastructure, critical and emerging technologies, and maritime security.
If, however, the aim was to create a minilateral that counters China’s increasingly assertive posture in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad has a long way to go.