The United States has used force abroad when it has judged its security or strategic influence to be at risk, particularly in regions it considers vital to its interests. The military operation that apprehended Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela fits this pattern, reasserting deterrence in response to Washington’s diminished influence in its own hemisphere. But the administration’s ultimate success depends on returning Venezuela to the path of democracy without getting bogged down in another doomed nation-building project.
Much of the initial commentary has focused on oil markets or alleged violations of the War Powers Resolution. But since the resolution’s enactment in 1973, presidents of both parties have authorized limited military actions without congressional authorization when they judged core U.S. interests to be at stake. Action against the Maduro regime reflects a broad, if sometimes understated, bipartisan concern. Congress should now be fully briefed and engaged in its proper oversight role.
Others have described this as an oil-driven intervention, but that framing is incomplete; it should be viewed as a response to concerns about sovereignty, hemispheric security, and the balance of influence in the Western Hemisphere. U.S. policy grappled with how to confront risks posed by external powers in the region. Over the past decade, China, Russia, and Iran have expanded their presence across Latin America by leveraging weak institutions and fragile states. Venezuela has exemplified that dynamic, tightening its relationship with fellow authoritarian governments. A renewed hemispheric focus, if handled carefully, can still work to advance US interests elsewhere. The United States is better positioned to reassure allies and deter adversaries globally when it is secure, sovereign, and stable in its own neighborhood.
Foreign adversaries have exploited an illegitimate and collapsing state as a platform to undermine U.S. interests in its own hemisphere. While Americans may debate tactics, there has long been agreement that allowing hostile powers to entrench themselves so close to home is incompatible with U.S. security. Operation Absolute Resolve is the manifestation of the 2025 National Security Strategy’s promise to restore deterrence in the Western Hemisphere. That both Russia and China have condemned U.S. actions in Venezuela underscores how the country has become a test case of great-power competition. A more stable, Western-aligned Venezuela could complicate the ambitions of principal adversaries.
Critics, particularly in Europe and on the American left, warn that such action risks establishing a precedent in which powerful states assert special prerogatives over their regions, potentially emboldening Russia or China elsewhere. That concern is serious and should be acknowledged. However, it overlooks key distinctions. Maduro’s regime is widely believed to have falsified presidential elections, leading the United States (notably, under the Biden administration) and many European officials to refuse to recognize the outcome. This raises questions about Venezuela’s claims to sovereign inviolability under the United Nations Charter—even if some governments, including Mexico’s, recognize the Maduro regime.
The flow of illicit drugs into the United States lends further legitimacy to the Trump administration’s decision. Over 100,000 Americans have died annually from overdoses, overwhelmingly driven by synthetic opioids such as fentanyl. While Venezuela is not a main channel in the fentanyl supply chain, it has long served as a central transit corridor for cocaine and a permissive environment for transnational criminal networks. These networks rely on chemical precursors sourced from China, processing and distribution hubs in Mexico and Central America, and cross-border cooperation between criminal organizations and elements of state security forces, including along the Colombia-Venezuela border. Maduro’s regime was deeply entangled with these trafficking ecosystems, functioning less as a counterweight to organized crime and more as its facilitator. The United States, despite a decades-long drug war, has been steadily losing ground because of this permissive environment.
Disrupting criminal-state entanglements is a necessary step toward limiting the reach of transnational trafficking networks that thrive under permissive regimes. Reasserting U.S. resolve is intended not to provoke, but to restore credibility that has eroded through years of inaction. That said, this effort will be seen by some as emboldening autocratic leaders to reassert their own spheres of influence. To counter this narrative, and avoid America’s fatigue of interventions, U.S. actions should remain limited in scope and duration. Any open-ended military commitment or broader occupation would be a strategic mistake, one that also risks broad bipartisan condemnation.
Ultimately, the success or failure of this operation will depend less on what the United States has done and more on what follows inside Venezuela. The priority should be a timely transfer of power that reflects the outcome Venezuelans already voted for, rather than a prolonged transitional process that allows regime holdovers or military figures to entrench themselves. If Venezuela emerges with another unelected authority or a military government, this effort will have failed.
This moment offers an opportunity for Venezuela to finally break itself from a cycle of repression. It also represents a challenge for the U.S. to act responsibly. Deposing a dictator is not easy, yet success will depend on restraint, diplomacy, and the ability to return Venezuela to the path of democracy.