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Commentary
Hudson Institute

Ukraine Military Situation Report | March 25

Can Kasapoglu Hudson Institute
Can Kasapoglu Hudson Institute
Senior Fellow (Nonresident)
Can Kasapoğlu
Fighters of the unmanned and ground robotic systems unit onto a platform for transport to a deployment point in Ukraine on March 10, 2026. (Getty Images)
Caption
Ukrainian Soldiers load a ground robotic system onto a platform for transport in Ukraine on March 10, 2026. (Getty Images)

Executive Summary
 

  • Battlefield assessment: The battlespace saw an intensified operational tempo last week, suggesting that a Russian spring offensive may be forthcoming. The front lines near Lyman saw heightened combat action, while Pokrovsk remained fiercely contested.
  • Ukrainian air strikes: Ukrainian robotic warfare systems hit the Saratov oil refinery in Russia.
  • A drone downs a Russian helicopter: A Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone downed a Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter, marking another instance of a drone intercepting a manned rotary-wing aircraft.
     

1. Battlefield Assessment

After weeks of relatively mid-tempo combat in Ukraine, the battlespace is now showing signs that Russian combat formations are preparing to launch a spring offensive.

The average number of daily tactical engagements climbed again last week to over two hundred. Russian forces gained territory, albeit at the tactical level, in the Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk, Novopavlivka, Kupiansk, Huliaipole, and Udachne sectors.

Approximately twenty percent of the overall fighting revolved around Pokrovsk, which remained hotly contested. Nonetheless, field assessments of engagements in February suggest that the combat performance of Russian artillery, a principal ground-warfare asset, has been particularly poor due to ammunition shortages and formidable Ukrainian resistance.

In addition to Pokrovsk, fierce fighting also raged around Lyman last week. On March 19, Russian forces launched a coordinated assault along the Lyman–Borova front, an attack which Ukrainian reporting described as Russia’s largest breakthrough attempt in the sector to date. The operation involved elements of Russia’s 1st Tank Army and 20th Combined Arms Army conducting simultaneous attacks across seven axes.

These units employed more than 500 servicemen, supported by armored vehicles and numerous light-mobility platforms, including motorcycles and buggies. Because elements of Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps contained and reversed the assault within hours, Russia’s attempted breakthrough failed to achieve operational penetration, and resulted in significant materiel losses. These losses included dozens of light vehicles, multiple infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs), and several main battle tanks.

Along the Lyman axis, Ukrainian forces reported localized gains despite numerous Russian assault waves. These advances were not the result of massed attacks, but instead reflected a deliberate shift in operational methods. Field reporting indicates that Ukrainian units have deprioritized direct engagements with Russian infantry formations and are instead targeting the enabling architecture behind those formations, including drone operators, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) launch sites, artillery systems, logistics corridors, and forward shelters.

This shift is reshaping patterns of engagement. Russian assault activity has declined in both frequency and coherence. Furthermore, Ukraine’s disruption of supply routes and staging areas is degrading Moscow’s ability to reinforce forward positions. Ukrainian elements are exploiting this friction to incrementally retake previously contested ground.

This new approach reflects a core Ukrainian assessment of Russian force employment. The Kremlin continues to accept significant personnel losses but has become more cautious in its use of critical enablers, including equipment, logistics networks, and trained technical specialists. Ukrainian targeting priorities increasingly reflect this asymmetry.

Open-source intelligence also indicates a growing density of FPV drone operations in the Lyman sector. These systems are being employed not only for tactical strikes but also to sustain pressure on critical support nodes of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Cumulative armor losses attributed to Ukrainian drone warfare are also trending upward. As a result, Russian combat effectiveness at the tactical edge is gradually eroding, less from direct confrontation than from Ukraine’s systematic dismantling of Moscow’s battlefield support systems.

March 24-March 25 saw a record increase in the Russian Shahed strike activity, with 948 drones launched within a 24-hour period. Lviv’s city center was among the highest-priority targets of the attack waves.

Ukraine also continued to target Russian energy infrastructure last week. Overnight on March 20, Kyiv employed drones to strike the Saratov oil refinery as part of a large-scale salvo involving approximately 300 robotic warfare systems.

2. Ukraine Uses Unmanned Systems to Target Russian Rotary-Wing Assets

Elements from Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reportedly employed a fiber-optic FPV drone to destroy a Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter along the Pokrovsk axis. Initial reporting on the incident emerged from Ukrainian Telegram accounts, including the country’s official combat-data outlet, which attributed the strike to the 59th Separate Assault Brigade.

Open-source footage of the incident shows the Ka-52 burning on the ground after impact. Aerial visuals indicate that an FPV system tracked the aircraft prior to the strike. Although the Russian crew attempted to withdraw from the aircraft after a forced landing, subsequent drone activity—reportedly from Ukraine’s 414th “Magyar’s Birds” combat group—prevented the escape attempt.

Following a strike on a Russian Mi-8 in late September 2025, this incident marks the second helicopter kill attributed to drone units of Ukraine’s 59th Brigade. The attack underscores the expanding role of FPV drone systems in targeting high-value rotary-wing assets in contested air-defense environments.

The helicopter downed by Ukraine last week was a Kamov Ka-52 “Alligator,” known by its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reporting name as “Hokum B.” Developed by the Kamov Design Bureau, an organization known for its coaxial rotor designs, the Ka-52 entered service in the early 2010s as a replacement for the Ka-50 “Black Shark.” The Ka-52 is a twin-seat, all-weather attack helicopter designed for high-intensity combat. Its configuration allows it to carry a second crew member, reducing pilot workload and improve performance during complex missions.

The aircraft’s defining feature is its coaxial rotor system, which eliminates the need for a tail rotor. This configuration increases agility, minimizes vulnerability to ground fire, and enables operations in confined terrain. Although the platform’s performance has been mixed, Russia has employed the Ka-52 extensively in Ukraine since 2022 for close air support, anti-armor strikes, reconnaissance, and counter-drone missions. As last week’s helicopter kill underscores, Ukrainian air-defense pressure remains strong and sustained across the battlespace.

3. What to Monitor in the Coming Weeks:

To bolster their defenses against Iran, several Gulf Arab states appear poised to move beyond exploratory engagement with Ukraine toward full-scale procurement. This shift could usher in formal contracts between Ukraine and its Gulf Arab partners, likely followed by advisor deployments and deliveries of counter-drone systems. Such commitments in the near term would serve as key indicators of evolving strategic dynamics in the Gulf region.

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