As the latest Gulf war intensifies and its economic consequences grow, two things seem clear. First, many Iran doves seriously underestimated the risks and costs of attempting to coexist with the regime. Second, many Iran hawks seriously underestimated the risks and costs of opposing Tehran’s drive for regional hegemony through military action. The result is a war that is more necessary than doves thought and harder to wage than hawks supposed.
Iran doves in past U.S. administrations hoped that a mix of conciliation and deterrence would allow America to coexist with Iran. Those hopes reflected confidence that Iran’s sophisticated civil society would ultimately either overthrow the Islamic Republic or drive its evolution in a more moderate direction. They also reflected legitimate concern about the costs and risks of military conflict with a country almost four times the size of Iraq and close to double Iraq’s population. Under the circumstances, kicking the can down the road in the hopes that something might turn up looked to a lot of smart people like the best of bad options.