How the US and Japan Can Prevent War with China

The United States and Japan face a crucial moment that will determine the future of global security—and their actions now will decide whether they can prevent a future crisis. In his new Japanese-language book Preventing a US-China War, Japan Chair Senior Fellow Masashi Murano gives an inside look at the deterrence landscape in the Indo-Pacific, the future of US-Japan cooperation, and China’s preparations for war. Then he engages in a dialogue with American national security experts like Hudson Senior Fellow Andrew Krepinevich Jr., Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, and Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby on America’s defense posture in an increasingly dangerous world.

Murano will sit down with Japan Chair Research Associate Iku Tsujihiro to discuss the book’s findings. An English transcript of their conversation is below.

Episode Transcript

This translation was created with the assistance of artificial intelligence. Please excuse any errors or inaccuracies.

Iku Tsujihiro (00:00):
Thank you for watching Hudson Institute’s YouTube channel. I’m Iku Tsujihiro, research associate at the Japan Chair of Hudson Institute. Today, I’m joined by Masashi Murano, senior fellow at the Japan Chair, to talk about his recently published book Preventing a US-China War. Thank you for joining us.

Masashi Murano (00:10):
Thank you for having me.

Iku Tsujihiro (00:12):
To start, could you tell us about the background and process that led you to write this book?

Masashi Murano (00:25):
Certainly. First, thank you for the opportunity. This book was published by PHP Shinsho. I had previously contributed to PHP’s monthly magazine, Voice, several times. In addition to my own essays, I had also written several interview-style contributions featuring US policy practitioners and members of the Washington think tank community. Eventually, they suggested, Why not compile all this into a single book? And that’s how this project began.

The book is structured in two main parts: one section consists of my original writing, and the other features dialogues with policy practitioners. When choosing interview partners, I was deliberate in selecting not regional specialists or Japan experts—often referred to in Japanese media as Japan hands—but instead strategists or functional-area experts on China. I mention this in the book’s preface as well. In Japanese media, many of the experts you see are regional specialists, such as experts on Japan, China, or Russia. Their perspectives are useful for understanding how Washington views Japan or how American experts view contemporary China or Russia. However, their influence on actual US strategic formulation is often limited.

In contrast, those who have greater influence on things like US defense strategy—the focus of this book—are from what we call the strategic community. These individuals are experts in operational concepts, force structure analysis, or defense budgeting.

These strategists are not usually fluent in Japanese and don’t frequently travel to Tokyo, so they aren’t well known in Japan. Furthermore, there’s not much interaction even between American regional experts and strategists. Given my own work in this area, I made a conscious effort to connect these regional and functional-area experts. With this book, I wanted to bring in voices beyond the usual Japan-focused experts and let Japanese readers understand the kinds of discussions we are having with these American strategists. That was the main purpose.

Iku Tsujihiro (04:45):
You’ve spoken with many experts. Let’s begin with Mr. Andrew Krepinevich. As he pointed out, there are many things about war that we simply cannot know until it actually happens. For instance, in the 1990s, US strategy was centered on deterring renewed aggression by Iraq against neighboring countries or an invasion of South Korea by North Korea.
But what actually happened was the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which forced the US to intervene in the Middle East. Now, if we formulate strategy focusing too narrowly on a Taiwan contingency, what happens if another unexpected event occurs?

Masashi Murano (05:31):
That’s a very difficult question. The risk you mention is one of the worst-case scenarios we might face after the current war in Ukraine reaches a ceasefire. If the US pushes for an early end to the Ukraine war to focus on China, that may be a valid approach. However, if Washington ends its indirect military support for Ukraine too early—before Europe can fully strengthen its own defense posture—it could invite another Russian invasion.

That could force the US to deal with simultaneous crises on multiple fronts—something we desperately want to avoid. We should be concentrating on the China challenge, but may end up getting pulled back into European affairs. That would be one of the worst outcomes post-Ukraine.

You could even call it a Trump shock or Biden shock. Both administrations showed signs of distancing the US from Europe. While that has good and bad aspects, it did force European nation—who had long relied heavily on the US, to wake up and take their own defense more seriously. That, in itself, was a good development. But can Europe really deter Russia without the US? There’s still serious doubt about that.

Though European countries have announced major defense investments in recent months, it will take years to rebuild the industrial base required to sustain such efforts. In the meantime, limitations will remain on how much equipment or personnel they can mobilize, especially in areas like air defense. In my view, when it comes to lower-intensity military operations in other regions, the US should conserve its own forces.

Take the current situation in Yemen, for example—operations against the Houthis. Ideally, the US wouldn’t need to send multiple destroyers or an aircraft carrier. Instead, the UK or France could take the lead. European nations have recently increased their military presence in the Indo-Pacific, including deploying aircraft carriers. This shows that Europe is finally beginning to recognize the strategic link between its own security and that of the Indo-Pacific, something it had long ignored. Security experts in Japan generally welcome this trend. But from my perspective, if they have that kind of capacity, they should be handling threats closer to home themselves. That kind of division of labor would be more appropriate. However, due to the current US administration’s stance, coordination with Europe has become more difficult. This makes it harder to negotiate role-sharing or make requests. That’s a concern. Another point I’d add: We must avoid unnecessary wars.

You mentioned earlier that the US was forced to intervene in the Middle East after 9/11.
The wars America fought in the 2000s—particularly in the Middle East—can be categorized under two concepts: wars of necessity and wars of choice.

These terms are also the titles of a book by Richard Haass from the Council on Foreign Relations. The war in Afghanistan, triggered by 9/11, was a war of necessity. But the Iraq War was a war of choice—a conflict the US entered voluntarily. As a result, the West wasted a decade of time and massive financial resources, inadvertently giving China a strategic window to build up its power. In retrospect, there might have been a better way.

Hypothetically, if the US had focused only on Afghanistan and avoided Iraq, we might be in a different situation today. It’s hard to say what that would look like, of course. The Iraq War was partly driven by the post–Cold War era’s hubris—the unipolar moment, where the US had no rival and felt emboldened to act. They had the power to do it—so they did. Today, the US no longer has that luxury. That’s why there’s now much greater caution around using military force. So while I don’t worry too much about the US waging another unnecessary war, I do worry that they might overcorrect based on the lessons of the 2000s. They may become too reluctant to use force—too restrained in foreign engagement. That, I think, is the more immediate concern for us.

Iku Tsujihiro (12:54):
Since we’re now talking about role-sharing, I’d like to shift to coalition-building. Historically, powers like Germany in World War I, the Axis powers in World War II, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were all defeated by allied coalitions.

Masashi Murano (13:14):
As Krepinevich pointed out, yes.

Iku Tsujihiro (13:15):
Exactly. And now more than ever, the US and its allies should reinforce their coalition-building. But on the other hand, we’re seeing contradictory signals—like placing South Korea on a sensitive export control list, despite the emphasis on Japan–South Korea–US trilateral cooperation.

H.R. McMaster also emphasized the importance of trilateral cooperation.
What are your thoughts on this?

Masashi Murano (13:48):
That’s a good question. I think there’s a gap even within Japan and the US in how much importance is assigned to trilateral cooperation with South Korea. I believe most policymakers in Japan, the US, and even South Korea recognize that trilateral cooperation is important. The issue is, how important is it really? It’s easy to say it’s important. But to what extent?

When it comes to contingencies involving the Korean Peninsula, it’s a different matter.
But if we’re talking about China, particularly a Taiwan contingency, there are many in both Japan and the US who believe South Korea wouldn’t be very reliable.

Because South Korea’s foreign policy is highly influenced by domestic politics, swinging left or right, some feel it’s a waste of precious political and time resources to count on Seoul.
To some extent, I can understand that sentiment. That doesn’t mean we should ignore South Korea. Rather, I think we should just focus on what can realistically be done.

At the working level among diplomats and defense officials, trilateral coordination is progressing. For example, in March, Japan launched its new Joint Operations Command.
There’s also the US–South Korea Combined Forces Command and plans to reorganize the US Forces Japan joint command. Coordination among these entities is deepening.

But such progress at the working level depends on having a clear political mandate.
If the political leadership doesn’t direct its agencies to coordinate, it won’t happen. The current Trump administration (speaking hypothetically or prospectively) doesn’t seem too interested in South Korea in the context of China deterrence. Meanwhile, South Korea is approaching a presidential election, and its political future is uncertain.

Unless Japan takes the initiative, trilateral cooperation could very well stall over the next four years. That said, a recent development gives me some hope: At the Defense Triad Dialogue, a high-level trilateral forum, Japan, the US, and South Korea held their first joint tabletop exercise. This is a significant step forward.

Although the dialogue only meets about once a year, it’s a key platform. And if we can keep the momentum going, I think it will help. Speaking personally, I believe that when it comes to deterring China, especially in a Taiwan contingency, South Korea’s role, and even the strategic flexibility of US Forces Korea, has real limitations. To be honest, I don’t expect too much there.

However, as I wrote in chapter 1 of the book, the worst-case scenario for the Japan-US alliance would be simultaneous crises on the Korean Peninsula and in Taiwan. To avoid that, it’s far more beneficial for us if South Korea and US Forces Korea focus on deterring North Korea, and doing that reliably.

That allows Japan and the US to focus on deterring China in the Taiwan Strait.
In that sense, it’s enough for South Korea to fulfill that role. To facilitate that division of labor, it’s essential to ensure communication and mutual understanding, especially if the US side has inflated expectations. Japan should actively clarify its own stance and push for realistic coordination. This concept also applies to Europe. Recently, I’ve been saying, “Think together, act or move separately.” We should work on shared analysis and strategy, but we don’t all have to operate in the same theater or the same way. Finding the optimal division of roles is what matters.

Iku Tsujihiro (19:15):
Let’s talk about escalation control. The concept of escalate to de-escalate comes to mind. How can we avoid escalation while also preventing deterrence from failing?
Finding the right balance seems extremely difficult. How do we determine that “just right” level?

Masashi Murano (19:35):
That’s a very important question. In fact, it was the topic of my master’s thesis. Ultimately, I think the only way to determine that balance is through practice and real-world experience. Escalation control isn’t just about preventing war. It also matters after war breaks out.

In technical terms, we call this intra-war deterrence—deterrence during conflict.
During war, deterrence success and failure happen repeatedly. Take the war in Ukraine. Putin threatened disastrous consequences, including potential nuclear use, if Russia’s territory was attacked. These threats did have an effect: Western countries hesitated to provide long-range weapons like ATACMS or Storm Shadow missiles that could hit deep into Russia. So, you could argue that Putin’s coercion partially worked. It delayed or suppressed Western military aid.

At the same time, Ukraine gradually expanded its attacks to include Russian-occupied areas and even parts of Russia itself. This is essentially a salami-slice strategy—probing incrementally to find where the real red lines are.

So, Ukraine didn’t take Russia’s warnings at face value. Instead, it tested them to identify actual thresholds. Moreover, by showing it could push those boundaries without triggering nuclear retaliation, Ukraine sent a message to its Western partners: Look, we did this and nothing happened. So, please send us more weapons.

This became a kind of diplomatic leverage. The term salami-slicing is usually associated with aggressive tactics used by China or Russia: incremental actions that change the status quo or create new facts on the ground.

So, it tends to be viewed negatively. But the technique itself, taking small steps to test or shift thresholds, is actually a core part of flexible response strategies and intra-war deterrence. Salami-slicing is not inherently bad.

What’s problematic is when countries like China or Russia use it to undermine the existing order through force. The idea of escalate to de-escalate—intentionally raising the stakes to force a negotiation or deter further aggression—is often treated with suspicion because of its association with Russia’s nuclear threats.

But in principle, this tactic can be a necessary part of our own strategy too, under certain conditions. To use salami-slicing or escalate-to-deescalate effectively, a few prerequisites must be met. First, legitimacy. You need to secure legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Escalating deliberately in every situation is not automatically wrong. If you can justify your actions and win support, you can gain strategic leverage. Ukraine, for example, succeeded in eventually convincing Western countries to supply long-range strike weapons. That’s because it made a compelling case and showed it could handle them responsibly.

Second, independent ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities. You must have at least a minimum level of your own surveillance and targeting capabilities. Without that, you can’t show allies what’s “safe” or manageable, and it’s hard to convince them to act. This is particularly true when allies are hesitant. Unless you can prove—using your own assets—that something is within operational tolerance, others won’t move. In the case of Ukraine, its ability to act on its own helped shift the positions of more cautious allies.

Another issue is intelligence sharing. Under the Trump administration, and even more broadly among US defense professionals, there’s an implicit idea that withholding intelligence can be a way to control escalation. If the US fears that an ally might go too far, it may limit the intel it shares. This becomes a tool to indirectly manage alliance behavior.

So even if the US isn’t trying to sabotage operations, it might restrain support by limiting the intelligence flow. Therefore, for allies including Japan, it’s vital to have their own ISR capabilities. When there’s a difference in perception between allies about how far one should go, showing we can do this ourselves creates leverage and helps secure the support needed.

Iku Tsujihiro (26:44):
That point about Ukraine needing to demonstrate its capabilities hits close to home for Japan. I’d like to return to ISR later, but first, let’s talk about defense spending.
There’s been discussion about increasing Japan’s defense budget to 3 percent of GDP.
What do you think is the best way to make that spending effective?

Masashi Murano (27:15):
That’s another tough question. In my book, I do touch briefly on the idea of a 3 percent target.
But first, we need to think about what comes after the current five-year defense buildup plan, which runs through 2027. We’re approaching the point where Japan must create the next five-year plan starting in FY2028. Here’s an issue that’s often overlooked:
The current plan, introduced alongside the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy in late 2022, assumes a yen–dollar exchange rate of about 108 yen to the dollar (after the first year). But over the past few years, especially since 2021, the yen has weakened significantly.

Even if the yen starts to strengthen again, it’s still far from where it was in 2022.
So, the purchasing power of the Japanese defense budget, especially when buying from abroad, has declined. This doesn’t just affect imported equipment. The cost of materials for domestically produced defense items has also surged. Therefore, even if the plan’s total budget is fixed at 43 trillion yen over five years, it may no longer be enough to achieve what was originally envisioned. So I think we have to revisit that 43 trillion yen ceiling, especially if exchange rates remain unfavorable.

Rather than fixating on a specific GDP percentage, we should start from needs—figure out what’s truly required, and then see what that adds up to in GDP terms. This is obviously tied to broader economic factors, like how US tariffs affect Japan’s economy, but let’s set that aside for now. What’s clear is that we must ramp up defense efforts beyond the current level. When you tally up what needs to be acquired, the list is long. For example, the Self-Defense Forces have started acquiring drones, but in many cases, we’ll need two or three times more than currently planned. Some of those systems—like missiles and drones—can be domestically produced. But there’s no point in saying, “We can build something in 10 years.” We need to be able to procure 300 or 400 units within a year or two. In some cases, that means relying on US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), even though the FMS system has various well-known issues. Still, there are some capabilities we simply can’t acquire without turning to the US

Another area that deserves more attention, especially outside the defense community, is infrastructure. Much of the public debate focuses on missiles, drones, and fighter jets. But shared base infrastructure, used by both US forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces, needs serious investment. One of our colleagues, Tim Walton, wrote a report about this. Okinawa’s bases are in relatively good condition, but others, like Iwakuni Air Base, which hosts both JMSDF and US Marine aircraft, are vulnerable. For example, China could disable key facilities at Iwakuni, including aircraft parking areas and fuel storage, with just 10 missiles carrying submunitions.

To counter this, we need to harden the bases, build concrete shelters, acquire rapid repair equipment, and ensure the base can bounce back quickly after an attack. Right now, the US Air Force is pursuing what it calls a “dispersal” strategy, spreading its aircraft across multiple bases to make it harder for adversaries to disable operations with a single strike.
They frequently shift their flight paths and basing to maintain unpredictability and ensure rapid deployment from anywhere. Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) is also adopting some of these concepts, influenced by the US Air Force’s operational thinking. But the Chinese military now has medium-range missiles and bomber units that can repeatedly strike dispersed bases, too.

So while dispersal is still important, base hardening is equally critical. If a base is hit and can’t be repaired quickly, it’s essentially out of action for the duration of the conflict. We have to invest in things like reinforced aircraft shelters, rapid runway and facility repair tools, and redundant fuel and power systems. These aren’t glamorous, but they are essential.

From one perspective, we can frame this kind of investment as Japan contributing more to the US alliance burden. Even though Japan’s government officially separates trade and defense issues, if we know that we will eventually have to increase Japan’s defense burden anyway, then we should consider linking defense investments with trade leverage, use it strategically.

Iku Tsujihiro (34:54):
Reading Mr. Elbridge Colby’s remarks, I found some of them quite tough. He argues that it’s irrelevant how much effort a country is making compared to its past; what matters is whether your forces can match or counter the enemy’s current capabilities. That’s fair, but still a bit harsh.

He also said Japan shouldn’t be worrying about Ukraine, that it should focus exclusively on its own region. He emphasized that Japan’s most urgent task is to strengthen its conventional denial capabilities.

He also raised concerns, as you mentioned earlier, about Japan’s ability to fully integrate its C4ISR systems: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.

Even though Japan established its new Joint Operations Command (JJOC), the command structure still isn’t fully integrated. And when you consider Japan’s intelligence and information security environment, Colby’s critiques seem valid, but also quite daunting for Japan.

Masashi Murano (36:16):

Yes, I completely agree. His points are tough, but they’re absolutely valid. In fact, some Japanese experts and policymakers have long been aware of these issues. What’s different now is that someone like Colby, who is actually involved in policymaking, is saying these things publicly. That seems to have finally prompted Japan to start taking these problems more seriously.

In the end, this comes down to how seriously political leadership is willing to confront reality—whether they have the resolve to face the challenge. I often say it’s not just about knowing what needs to be done; it’s about whether we’ve made the decision to do it. The good news is, we already know what the main problems are in Japan’s security and defense posture. The challenge is not identifying them. It’s that we haven’t fixed them yet, even though they’ve been recognized for some time. Yes, some of that is due to bureaucratic or structural inertia. But I believe that if Japan’s political leadership really commits, there’s a lot we can do, whether it’s increasing defense spending or integrating ISR more effectively.

Even within the Self-Defense Forces, we’ve seen some gradual progress, particularly on ISR. Still, it’s been a long time since we started saying “jointness,” and true inter-service integration is still lacking. The same goes for information security. It’s still not where it needs to be.

The real question is, Do we understand how serious the consequences could be if these gaps remain unresolved? We’re starting to see that kind of awareness develop in cybersecurity, but it hasn’t spread widely enough. Once political leaders fully grasp the potential severity of the outcomes, I believe they’ll be more willing to address these problems with urgency.

The same shift happened with the decision to raise Japan’s defense budget to the NATO-standard 2 percent of GDP. This came after the so-called Davidson window—the prediction that by 2027, China could be ready to invade Taiwan. Even if that’s just Xi Jinping’s stated directive to the PLA, the fact that it was taken seriously finally pushed political leaders to act.

Before that, experts had been saying for years that 1 percent of GDP is nowhere near enough. But only recently has political leadership begun moving from the top down.

One specific idea I’d propose is to have more cabinet-level ministers and lawmakers participate in tabletop exercises or policy simulations. Let them experience firsthand what would happen if Japan were drawn into a real crisis.

Many politicians who’ve participated in these simulations have come away with a much deeper sense of urgency. Of course, how the simulation is designed matters. But giving leaders a visceral feel for crisis dynamics is one of the key values of tabletop exercises and war games. So, I believe that kind of practical, experiential engagement should absolutely be on the table.

Iku Tsujihiro (40:31):
That’s a great segue into my next question—the war game conducted by CSIS. You wrote about it in your book. Out of the 24 scenarios simulated, China failed to take Taiwan in all but one. The only scenario where China succeeded was when the Japanese government refused to allow the US to use bases in Japan. Could you elaborate on what exactly that scenario entailed? Did the ban include even basic operations like securing air superiority or air defense? And do you think such a scenario is really possible? If so, what should the Japanese government do now to prepare and make sound decisions in a crisis?

Masashi Murano (41:38):
Great question. First, let me explain the premise. The scenario where China succeeded was, in a sense, constructed deliberately. It was meant to test what conditions would allow China to win. In that specific case, Japan refused to allow the US to use its bases in the event of a Taiwan contingency. So the US had to launch all its air missions, including bombers and fighters, from Guam.

In the other 23 scenarios, players had the option to use Guam or carriers, but they overwhelmingly preferred using bases in Japan. That preference shows just how crucial Japanese base access is to US operations. Launching from Guam creates longer flight times and lower sortie rates, especially when trying to strike Chinese amphibious fleets en route to Taiwan. That’s why the efficiency of US interdiction operations drops dramatically when Japan’s bases are off the table.

Also, if China knows that US planes won’t be launching from Japan, it can concentrate its strike capabilities on fewer targets, like Guam. Right now, only China’s DF-26 ballistic missile can reach Guam, but their bomber force is also expanding its range, meaning Guam could be exposed to repeated strikes. To protect US bombers en route from Guam, fighters from Japan are essential. If Japan doesn’t allow fighter escorts to launch, those bombers could be intercepted by Chinese fighters or bombers. That further reduces US strike effectiveness and increases losses.

So even if Japan allows “some use” of its bases, any political or operational constraints, such as geographic restrictions or sortie limitations, could still significantly impact mission success.

On top of that, there’s the physical threat. China has the capability to sustain large-scale, repeated missile strikes on Japan. Even if Japan gives permission, China could effectively shut down those bases with force. So, if Japan decides to allow the US to use its bases, we also need to understand what kinds of operations the US might conduct from those bases—and what risks Japan would face as a result.

I’m sure that officials in both the Japanese and US governments, as well as in the Self-Defense Forces and US military, are already considering these possibilities. But I believe it’s also important to be honest with the public about those risks. Traditionally, Japan’s government tends to avoid discussing anything that involves risk.
If something can’t be guaranteed as “risk-free,” then the tendency is to say nothing at all.

But that approach isn’t sustainable. Going forward, we need to explain the situation more like this: “There are two risks: A and B. We have to choose the lesser of the two.” For example, If Japan refuses to let the US use its bases and Taiwan falls to China, the consequences for Japan’s security environment would be severe. Not only would Japan face direct physical threats from China, but Japan’s reliability as a US ally would be called into question.

If Japan doesn’t cooperate in defending Taiwan, Washington will inevitably doubt the value of the alliance. The worst-case scenario is that Taiwan falls and the US-Japan alliance is left in tatters, forcing Japan to face China alone, right on its doorstep. So we have to weigh that outcome—the long-term cost of inaction—against the short-term risk of being targeted if we allow the US to use our bases.

These aren’t black-and-white issues. They’re about degrees of risk, and explaining those degrees honestly to the public is something think tanks like ours should help with. It’s not about saying “everything will be fine” or “we’ll be destroyed.” It’s about helping people understand the spectrum of consequences so we can make rational choices.

Iku Tsujihiro (49:04):
Let’s turn to your conversation with Dr. Beckley. You discussed whether a Taiwan contingency would become a short, sharp war or a prolonged conflict.

Which scenario do you personally believe offers a better chance for success?
Of course, that depends on Taiwan’s will to fight over time, the level of US-Japan cooperation, and other factors. But I can’t help but worry: If it drags on too long, won’t it become another war of attrition like Ukraine?

Masashi Murano (49:47):
It’s very difficult to say definitively. Frankly, I think we need to be prepared for both scenarios. It’s not a matter of which is more desirable. Even in the future, I think it will remain hard to say whether a short or long conflict would favor us more. As you mentioned, if China launches a rapid, high-intensity campaign and Taiwan manages to withstand the initial wave, then perhaps Taiwan’s will to fight would inspire support from the US and other countries, much like what happened with Ukraine.

But if the war drags on too long, Taiwan’s morale may collapse. People might grow war-weary, and a sentiment could grow that says maybe it’s time to settle. Let’s make a deal and stop the suffering. That’s a real risk. As Krepinevich said, this could become a contest of endurance—a test of who can tolerate suffering longer. That’s often how wars are decided. Which side’s population and political system can endure more hardship?

And in Japan, even talking about wartime hardship brings back memories of World War II: rationing, shortages, economic collapse. It’s emotionally loaded. Can people today tolerate: Soaring prices? Empty shelves? Disrupted energy supplies? These are very real possibilities in a major war. And again, this ties back to the earlier discussion: We must compare present-day risk and hardship with the even greater dangers we’d face in the future if we do nothing now. If we can endure short-term pain to prevent a worse long-term outcome, that’s a tradeoff we need to explain clearly. And, crucially, political leaders must be able to offer a clear path to victory or success. People will endure hardship if they believe it leads somewhere.

If there’s no hope of winning, public support will evaporate, as we’ve seen in parts of the US regarding support for Ukraine. Once people start saying, let’s just stop, it becomes very difficult to continue politically or militarily. On the other hand, if the US truly mobilizes its industrial base and defense production, it can outlast China in the medium-to-long term. So, which side has the edge? It’s hard to say. Both scenarios present unique challenges.

Iku Tsujihiro (53:36):
We’ve covered a wide range of topics today—escalation, deterrence, role-sharing, long vs. short war. To close things out, could you share what message you most want to convey to your readers and to the broader public through this book?

Masashi Murano (53:51):
Absolutely. To sum it up in one phrase, I would say this decade is decisive.

Right now, in the 2020s, we are living in a critical window where decisions made today will shape our ability to prevent or endure a future crisis. That’s why it’s so important to talk about deterrence now. Of course, deterrence is about preventing war. But even if we fail to deter and a conflict breaks out, we still need to limit the damage, protect our allies, and survive as a nation. Too often in Japan, discussions about deterrence are limited to whether we can avoid war or not. But deterrence also includes questions like: How do we fight if war breaks out? How do we end the war with favorable conditions? How do we protect civilians and infrastructure during a conflict?

These are uncomfortable topics, but they are absolutely necessary. And the sooner we face them, the more options we have. Right now, Japan still has time to build up its capabilities. We have resources, alliances, and a relatively secure geography. But that window won’t stay open forever. If we squander the next few years, we may find ourselves cornered later on, forced to act without preparation. And that’s when nations truly risk catastrophe. So, I hope this book will encourage more people to start thinking seriously about the decisions we need to make now, both as individuals and as a country.

Iku Tsujihiro (55:35):
Thank you very much, Mr. Murano. I hope many people read your book and take this discussion to heart. Thank you again for your time.