Introduction
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine will soon enter its third winter, and there is no end in sight. A war that Russian military planners had hoped would last for only a few days has become a quagmire that has cost Russia hundreds of thousands of soldiers, thousands of pieces of heavy armor, hundreds of aircraft, and approximately one-third of its Black Sea Fleet. There are only two possible explanations for this failure: either Russia’s intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) was grossly inaccurate; or the Kremlin’s generals caved under political pressure from President Vladimir Putin and invaded Ukraine with hardly any real military assessment.
This summer, the war took another unexpected twist. For the first time in more than 80 years, an outside power has invaded and controlled Russian territory. On August 6, thousands of Ukrainian troops and hundreds of armored vehicles began a surprise raid into Russia’s Kursk Oblast (see map 1). Reports indicate that Ukraine has captured more than 100 settlements and now controls substantial Russian territory. At the time of this publication, Russian forces have started counteroffensive operations. But open-source intelligence suggests that the Ukrainian military has the manpower, engineering capabilities, and logistics support to stabilize the front.
Georgian Legion Commander Mamuka Mamulashvili, whose forces are currently fighting in Ukraine, once said that “the fight for Ukraine will end on the territory of Russia.” The long-term battlefield impact of Ukraine’s military operation in Kursk remains to be seen. But if the operation is successful, it could dramatically change the direction of the war.
Map 1. Ukraine and Russia’s Kursk Oblast
Source: Authors’ research.
Why Kursk?
Ukraine’s audacious military operation may have surprised analysts and military planners around the world, but the location and timing of this offensive are far from coincidental. Below are five reasons Kursk matters to the war.
- Kursk Oblast has historical ties to Ukrainian culture, and the Ukrainian public views the region positively, emotionally, and sentimentally. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Russian tsar granted Ukrainian peasants, Cossacks, and other settlers tracts of land called slobodas in what is now Kursk, Belgorod, and Voronezh Oblasts in Russia and Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts in Ukraine. This region was known as Sloboda Ukraine. The tsar granted these slobodas significant governing autonomy and tax-free status, which gave the region a unique cultural identity that is still evident today. Although accurate census data is scarce, it is believed that tens of thousands of ethnic Ukrainians currently reside in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. Interestingly, the current front lines in Kursk roughly match the border between the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic and Bolshevik-controlled areas of Russia in 1918.
- Kursk is home to crucial transport links. These include major highways and roads that transport military supplies and troops from Russia and Belarus to the front lines in Ukraine. Additionally, the Kursk railway hub connects central Russia with southwestern regions of the country, including the border areas near Ukraine. This makes Kursk vital for Russian logistics.
- Kursk is home to the Sudzha gas terminal. As part of a contract that expires at the end of this year, Ukraine allows Russian gas from the Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhhorod pipeline to transit its territory. In total, about 14 to 15 billion cubic meters flow through the pipeline per year, with the main recipients being Slovakia, Austria, and Hungary. Ukrainian control of the entry point of Russian gas into the country would give Kyiv significant leverage in future negotiations.
- Kursk is home to a major nuclear power plant. Ukraine could use the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant as a bargaining chip to encourage Russia to relinquish control of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Ukrainian forces are currently about 30 miles from the Kursk plant, though Russia has constructed robust defensive positions around it.
- The terrain is suitable for the type of war Ukraine is conducting. The topography of the Kursk-Ukraine border region is suitable for the type of warfare involving armored vehicles and tanks that Ukraine is currently conducting. This has facilitated Ukraine’s rapid advance. Notably, Kursk was the site of a major World War II battle that is still the largest tank engagement in history.
Why Now?
The timing of Ukraine’s military operation is also no coincidence. Most of the world was distracted—at least initially. Many Europeans treat August as a vacation month. Americans are focused on the presidential race. And Olympic Games dominated the headlines. But there are other important reasons Ukraine chose now to invade.
- New American military aid has arrived. The Kursk operation began about four months after Congress passed its most recent aid package for Ukraine. It likely took this amount of time for the Ukrainians to receive and deploy equipment, weapons, and munitions arriving from the US.
- Weather conditions are favorable. If traditional weather patterns hold, an August campaign gives Ukraine just enough time to make advances before the fall muddy season, known as the bezdorizhzhia, arrives to mire a potential Russian counterattack. Importantly, Ukraine also launched its highly successful 2022 Kherson counteroffensive in August.
- Timing with the anniversary of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. Although this is likely a smaller consideration, it is worth noting that Ukraine’s Kursk operation began around the anniversary of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. Pro-Ukraine social media posts show Georgian volunteers fighting alongside Ukrainians inside Russia.
The Situation in Kursk
The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have strategically occupied more than 100 settlements across some 500 square miles. This calculated incursion has penetrated roughly 21 miles inside Russia, a testament to the UAF’s political-military capabilities. The Ukrainian General Staff has fielded battalions from mechanized and air-assault brigades alongside special combat formations such as Ukrainian Defense Intelligence’s 130th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion to sweep Sudzha. Additionally, the 14th Regiment of the Unmanned Systems Command is conducting drone warfare operations in the theater.
Kyiv’s surprise campaign has captured hundreds, if not thousands, of prisoners of war (POWs). This success is the result of Moscow’s decision to send poorly trained and ill-disciplined units to the front and the surprise factor of the Ukrainian blitz.
The Russian General Staff responded urgently, albeit belatedly, to the initial tactical shock. But only recently did it begin deploying higher-value combat formations into Kursk, including detachments from naval infantry and the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV). These deployments mark the launch of a significant counteroffensive. While the Russian military has only registered tactical gains so far, the ongoing offensive action indicates that Moscow is determined to respond forcefully, suggesting that the Kremlin feels that the political stakes are rising. Using KGB-style information control tactics, Putin opted to downplay the Kursk fiasco at its outset. But the optics of Russia being invaded under Putin’s watch have forced the Kremlin to commit more resources to the incursion.
The Tactical Situation
From the very first day of the Kursk campaign, the Ukrainian Air Force has relentlessly attacked the Russian forces. Ukraine has even deployed MiG-29 fighter aircraft to conduct combat sorties with joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs), showcasing the semi-permissive character of the airspace over Kursk. Air power has also been instrumental in disrupting Russia’s logistics efforts. For example, Ukraine’s strategic strikes have helped destroy permanent and mushrooming pontoon bridges along the Seym River, a move that has critically damaged Russian supply lines.
Notably, Ukraine is waging a political warfare campaign in Kursk in addition to its kinetic efforts. The UAF has conducted stability operations to win the hearts and minds of the local population. Meanwhile, Ukraine has backed these efforts on the ground with a thorough information campaign in the digital space. Ukrainian servicemen have systematically documented and shared friendly exchanges with people in the occupied areas. And recently, Kyiv took steps to internationalize the incursion’s diplomatic outreach. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry appealed to the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross for assistance in humanitarian outreach in Ukrainian-controlled areas of Russia. This all suggests that Ukraine intends to hold Kursk for the duration of the war.
Ukraine’s Goals
Ukraine’s Kursk incursion has multiple goals.
First, Kyiv has positively shifted the war’s narrative. In recent months, onlookers have perceived the conflict as a stalemate. Russia was making minor territorial gains in Donetsk, and Ukraine appeared to be on the back foot. By seizing territory in Russia, Ukraine now appears to have the upper hand in the conflict.
Second, Ukraine hopes that Russia will be forced to divert manpower and equipment to deal with the situation in Kursk. Though 500 square miles is small relative to the size of the Russian Federation, even a single square meter under Ukraine’s control creates political problems for the Kremlin. If political pressure forces Putin to divert resources, the UAF may be able to stabilize some of the more difficult sections of the front line or even advance in other areas in Ukraine.
Third, Ukraine aims to create a buffer around Sumy Oblast. During the early weeks of the war, Russian troops tried capturing Sumy, but a stiff Ukrainian resistance held on until all Russian forces were expelled from the region in April 2022. However, since then, Sumy and the surrounding region have been the target of thousands of Russian air, missile, drone, and artillery strikes. Pushing the front lines into Kursk makes it harder for Russia to strike Sumy.
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, Ukrainian control of Russian territory means that the conflict is less prone to being frozen along the existing front lines as part of a negotiated settlement. If Ukraine can maintain control over some Russian territory, a land swap is more likely. Kyiv reasonably believes that controlling Russian territory will help it regain more of its own territory from Moscow.
Controlling Russian territory gives Ukraine a stronger hand in future negotiations—especially if the UAF controls the Sudzha gas terminal or Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. But for this strategy to succeed, Ukraine needs to avoid overextending itself by taking more Russian territory than it can hold and defend.
Lessons from the Kursk Operation
Even though the operation has only been going on for several weeks, policymakers and military planners should note five initial lessons.
- Russia’s red lines remain unsubstantiated. Since the beginning of the large-scale invasion, senior Russian officials have declared multiple “red lines,” such as Ukrainian strikes on targets in occupied Crimea or the Russian Federation. The Kremlin has threatened “nuclear war” and “catastrophic consequences.” But Ukraine and its partners have crossed multiple so-called red lines since 2022 with no direct consequences. Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast is the latest example.
- The unexpected happens in warfare. The history of warfare is littered with examples of surprise attacks and unexpected acts. The war in Ukraine is no different. In 2022, the world was shocked by Russia’s large-scale invasion as well as by Ukraine’s successful defense of Kyiv and Kherson counteroffensive. In 2023, the Wagner rebellion surprised many who were not tracking Russia’s internal power struggles. This year, nobody expected Ukraine to enter Kursk Oblast and control Russian territory. Policymakers need to think about—and plan for—the unthinkable. Ukraine’s latest gambit is a reminder of this.
- Morale and discipline matter. Ukraine’s forces have reasonably high morale and good discipline, particularly those participating in the Kursk operation. The fact that Ukraine could keep such a major operation secret in the era of open-source intelligence, social media, smartphones, and commercial satellite imagery is a testament to the discipline and morale of Ukrainian soldiers.
- Russian governmental departments are not coordinated. Despite the Kremlin’s efforts to coordinate its response to Ukraine’s military operations in Kursk, Russia’s response has been disjointed and slow. Under a functional system, the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the National Guard (Rosgvardiya), the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM), and the regional authorities in Kursk would have coordinated their response under the auspices of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. So far, the council does not seem to have successfully facilitated cooperation. This likely places former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who was recently appointed secretary of the council, in a dangerous political situation.
- Russia has vulnerabilities on its home front. From the outset of Putin’s so-called special military operation, two particular incidents have shaken the Kremlin’s control: the Wagner uprising and the Ukrainian push into Kursk. Both incidents show the limits of the Putin regime’s reflexes amid mounting political-military contingencies. Russian leadership’s prioritization of loyalty over competency—typical of the autocratic siloviki, a clan comprising former Soviet intelligence operatives—also contributed to Moscow’s ineffective response. A careful analysis of the Wagner uprising and the Kursk invasion reveals Russia’s critical vulnerabilities.
What the US and Europe Should Do
Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive disappointed Kyiv’s supporters. But the UAF’s lack of progress was largely caused by America’s failure to provide sufficient equipment in a timely manner and was exacerbated by a Ukrainian strategy that spread its forces too thin. Hopefully, Kyiv and Washington have learned from these shortfalls.
While Ukraine holds Russian territory, the US and its European partners need to work closely with Ukraine to help Kyiv take full advantage of the situation. Below are five ways to do so.
- Publicly support Ukraine’s actions in Kursk. The US should make it clear on the international stage that it supports Ukraine’s legitimate military actions in Kursk Oblast and encourage its European partners to do the same.
- Remove all restrictions on the use of American-provided weapons and encourage European partners to do the same. The ongoing public debate about whether Ukraine can use long-range weapons like Storm Shadow or Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles against targets inside the Russian Federation is a strategic communications error. It signals Western weakness and indecision while making Ukraine appear desperate. By adhering to Russia’s dubious red lines, Washington allows Moscow to dictate the terms of the conflict. If the Kremlin’s forces strike Ukraine from Russian territory, the US should allow Kyiv to use any weapons system against any legitimate military target, even those inside Russia.
- Ensure a continuous flow of actionable intelligence to Ukrainian officials and commanders. Just as US officials are reluctant to allow Ukraine to use American-made weapons on Russian soil, they may also be hesitant to provide Kyiv with actionable intelligence. The US should establish special measures to ensure that it can give real-time, actionable intelligence about Kursk to Ukrainian forces.
- Expedite the flow of the weapons and equipment Ukraine needs to maintain and, if possible, expand its foothold in Kursk. The Department of Defense, working closely with the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, should establish a task force focused solely on providing Ukraine with the specific equipment, weapons, and munitions necessary for the success of the Kursk operation as quickly as possible.