Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to numerous unintended global consequences.
Among these are heightened concerns about food insecurity, especially in vulnerable regions, and an acute energy crisis in Europe, which is only now being addressed through a complete restructuring of the continent’s energy imports. Economic uncertainty and inflation have surged, particularly in Africa and the Middle East.
However, one consequence that has escaped widespread discussion is the impact on efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.
To understand this issue, it is essential to examine the recent history of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, 15 newly independent states emerged, three of which —Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus — found themselves in possession of sizable numbers of Soviet nuclear weapons. While Kazakhstan and Belarus quickly transferred control of their nuclear arsenals to Moscow, Ukraine’s situation was different.
At the time, Ukraine unexpectedly became the world’s third-largest nuclear power. This triggered an internal debate about the country’s nuclear future. On the one hand, many of these weapons were nearing the end of their operational life, and Ukraine lacked the resources to modernize and maintain them. On the other hand, there was significant support for retaining a nuclear deterrent to ensure the nation’s security and defense.
Ultimately, after significant international pressure, Ukraine agreed to relinquish all its inherited nuclear weapons in exchange for substantial economic support and security guarantees from Russia, the US and the UK. This agreement culminated in the signing of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances on Dec. 5, 1994.
This week marks the 30th anniversary of the agreement. According to the memorandum, Russia, the UK and the US agreed to “reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”
However, as time went on, the Budapest Memorandum became fraught with ambiguities. It meant different things to different parties. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Ukrainians have accused their Western partners of failing to honor the memorandum’s security guarantees.
From the US perspective, the Budapest Memorandum was a memorandum — not a legally binding treaty. For the US, obligations under such agreements require Senate ratification to carry the force of law. While the US and UK argue that it is Russia, not them, that has violated the memorandum, this distinction remains a sore point for Ukraine.
This week, during a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha held up the country’s original copy of the Budapest Memorandum, as a symbolic reminder to the world of the commitments made three decades ago.
In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, three significant consequences for global nuclear nonproliferation efforts have emerged.
First, no country currently in possession of nuclear weapons — or close to developing them — will willingly give them up. Ukraine’s experience has underscored the risks of disarmament. Had Ukraine retained even a limited nuclear deterrent, it is unlikely that Russia would have invaded in 2014 or 2022. This lesson will not be lost on other countries. States with nuclear ambitions will be emboldened to develop and maintain their arsenals, making global nuclear disarmament a distant goal.
Secondly, the war in Ukraine has inadvertently strengthened the nuclear capabilities of Iran and North Korea. Facing unexpected setbacks in its campaign, Russia has relied on material and manpower support from these allies. North Korea, for example, has provided Russia with artillery shells and ballistic missiles. Recent reports even suggest North Korea has sent thousands of soldiers to fight alongside Russian forces.
This support has not come without a price. It is widely suspected that Russia has offered nuclear or missile technology in exchange. Speaking in Brussels, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warned that “there’s every reason to believe that nuclear and missile technology is flowing into North Korea.”
Finally, the possibility of Ukraine pursuing a nuclear weapons program cannot be dismissed. With trust in the Budapest Memorandum shattered and the prospect of NATO membership — and its accompanying security guarantees — still remote, President Volodymyr Zelensky has hinted that Ukraine may have no choice but to reconsider its nuclear options. While there is no evidence that Ukraine is actively pursuing nuclear weapons, experts agree that the country has the technical expertise and resources to do so in the future.
It would be a tragic irony if the Budapest Memorandum, designed to reduce the number of nuclear-armed states, ended up accelerating nuclear proliferation. The memorandum highlights how partial solutions to complex security problems can lead to unintended and far-reaching consequences.
As President Donald Trump prepares to enter the Oval Office next year, he has expressed a desire to negotiate a settlement between Russia and Ukraine. Any such deal must include robust and enforceable security guarantees for Kyiv. Ukraine, understandably skeptical of diplomatic assurances, will demand more than cleverly worded agreements with little practical enforcement.
Historians may one day look back on the Budapest Memorandum and the subsequent war as the moment the global nonproliferation regime began to unravel. Without credible commitments and enforcement mechanisms, efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons may prove futile, leaving the world a far more dangerous place.
In this context, the lessons of the Budapest Memorandum should serve as a cautionary tale. Only comprehensive and enforceable security agreements can prevent the next crisis of trust — and proliferation—from happening in the future.
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